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Foreword
I chose to research US foreign policy towards Indonesia, specifically United
States cultural programs that aim to increase cultural affinity between the two
countries. Top diplomats, including the ambassadors from America and Indonesia
have agreed on the need for person-to-person relationships to foster bilateral
goodwill, so the next step is the actual implementation of programs to that end. This
paper will focus on answering three questions central to US foreign policy towards
Indonesia:
1.

What are the major roadblocks that currently prevent the United States
and Indonesia from becoming closer linked strategically, economically
and culturally?

2.

Which socio-cultural programs are most effective at overcoming these
roadblocks?

3.

What elements should future cultural programs include in order to
generate goodwill towards the United States?

While I realize the limited scope of my research restricts me from making
broad generalizing claims about Indonesian attitudes, my research serves a
normative function in laying out standards for what future cultural programs should
look like.
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Research Focus
Recognizing that Indonesian policy towards the US also serves an important
purpose in the bilateral relationship, I chose to focus my research on American
foreign policy programs for three reasons.
First, in my experience, the average Indonesian knows a lot more about America
than the average American knows about Indonesia. Perhaps due to America’s mass
media reach, Hollywood’s cultural hegemony, or President Obama’s education in
Indonesia, the Indonesians I came into contact with knew basic facts about America.
Indonesians would likely be able to locate America on a map, identify a few key
states (New York, California and Texas) and name the current American president,
which could not be said about Americans asked about Indonesia.
Second, the relationship between the United States and Indonesia tends not to be
an equal relationship of partners. As I will explain, American and Indonesian ‘joint
ventures’ often turn into transactional exchanges, with the US providing capital or
material assistance in exchange for cooperation on security or trade issues. Bilateral
programs tend to be led and dominated by the United States, which commands the
lion’s share of the wealth and resources, both physical and political. As such,
Indonesian action towards the United States is often constrained.
Third, as Indonesia is the staging ground for American foreign policy programs,
and America for Indonesian programs, it is easier to study American foreign policy
abroad. As my research lent itself to a cultural-lens observation of US foreign policy,
it was more appropriate to focus on programs in Indonesia, where I was able to
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interview program participants, practitioners and diplomats who were actually
involved in the “nitty gritty” of program implementation.
Throughout this essay, I will refer to the goals of US-led cultural programs in
Indonesia as generating “cultural affinity.” I define this term as the degree to which
culture makes achieving foreign policy goals easier, as opposed to more difficult.
For the purpose of this analysis, cultural affinity suggests the ease of generating
good will and a sense of friendship towards the United States among the Indonesian
public.
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Introduction
This essay will first focus on the historical legacy of United States foreign
policy towards Indonesia, arguing that security exigencies and military-to-military
linkages have historically driven the US-Indonesian relationship. I will also briefly
explain the current diplomatic consensus of how best to “broaden” the US-Indonesia
bilateral relationship. The second section will explain roadblocks towards
strengthening the relationship, including strategic, economic and cultural barriers
to cultural affinity. The third and final section will use public opinion polling data
and collected primary source information in order to make recommendations about
how to implement future US-led cultural programs in Indonesia.
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Section One: The Historical Dimension
Birth of a Bilateral Relationship
The United States’ relationship with Indonesia began shortly after Indonesia
declared its independence from the Netherlands in 1949. During the early 1950’s,
Indonesian parliaments were frustrated with growing unrest and an inability to
effectively govern because of inadequate police forces.1 As a result of political
turbulence in Indonesia, the Indonesian government was forced to re-prioritize
their foreign policy objectives. While the founding fathers of Indonesia had
originally developed a foreign policy that was “bebas aktif,” or “free and active,”
Indonesia increasingly relied on US security assistance, nudging the country further
from its official stance of non-alignment. The United States was happy to provide
military and economic aid to Indonesia, as it fell neatly into their 1950’s foreign
policy strategy of “containment.” The United States, fearing that the fall of strategic
“domino” states to communism might cause other states to follow suit, committed to
fighting the communist influence around the world in developing battleground
states like Indonesia. Conveniently, the Indonesian governments in the early 1950’s
were also suspicious that the USSR had bankrolled communist revolts in Indonesia,
and happily accepted over five million dollars in direct military aid from the United
States.2

1

Richard Mason, "Indonesia, the Cold War and Non-Alignment: Relations of the
Early Indonesian Cabinets with the United States, 1950-52," Journal of International
Studies 6(2010).
2

Ibid.
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Cold War Policy
The Cold War continued to have a massive influence on US policy towards
Indonesia. As Indonesia is located at the strategic crossroads of the Malacca, Lana
and Sunda straits, it controls a central hub of the vast energy and commodity Pacific
shipping lanes. Additionally, Indonesia’s natural resource abundance (including
huge deposits of tin, rubber, petroleum and gold) made it an attractive location for
the US to exert its influence.3 However, while Indonesia was an appealing prize
strategically, the world’s Cold War context made it even more desirable. As the
United States viewed its own influence as zero sum vis-à-vis USSR influence over
developing countries, a victory for the US also meant a crucial defeat for
communism. Conversely, communist victory in Indonesia would have meant a
defeat for the democratic values and principles nominally championed by the United
States during the Cold War.
During the next few decades, President Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy,”
(Demokrasi Terpimpin) subverted Indonesia’s parliamentary democracy and
gradually ceded more and more political control to military elements led by
Sukarno. While the United States publically partnered with the Sukarno-led
government, they happily increased military aid once Suharto (an anti-communist
general,) came to power in a military coup in 1965.4 Money and weapons were a
small price for the United States to pay for an anti-communist strongman who was

3

F. X. Baskara T. Wardaya, "A Cold War Shadow: United States Policy toward
Indonesia, 1953--1963" (Ph.D., Marquette University, 2001).
4

Bruce Vaughn, "Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and U.S.
Interests," US Congressional Research Service 7, no. 5700 (2011).
8

not afraid to suppress political dissidents. All in all, over 500,000 Indonesians lost
their lives in the years after Suharto’s coup in a series of ruthless mass killings.5 In
this respect, the United States demonstrated that it was more concerned with
maintaining a security and strategic relationship with Indonesia than it was with
promoting liberal values and democracy abroad. This revealed an evident schism
between American rhetoric and actual American policies around the world. I will
later discuss how this hypocrisy negatively influences the attitudes of modern
Indonesians, who recognize American duplicity in promoting democracy abroad
while ignoring the US’s historical support for Suharto, a brutal and illiberal military
dictator.

Conscientious Objection
After the Cold War ended, the United States was once again quick to
condemn Indonesia for human rights abuses within its borders. The main area of
dispute occurred in 1991, when the Indonesian military summarily executed over
700 pro-independence citizens of Timor-Leste during the “Santa Cruz Massacre.”6
Following the massacre, the United States used military aid as a lever through which
to influence Indonesian policy, temporarily suspending the International Military
Education and Training program, the official grant mechanism for dispensing aid
to Indonesia. Sanctions of the Indonesian military and security apparatus
continued until the late 1990’s. It is also important to note that the United States
5

Ibid.
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Ted Osius Murray Hiebert, Gregory B. Poling. , "A Us-Indonesia Partnership for
2020,"(Center for Strategic and international Studies, 2013).
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minimally emphasized economic engagement with Indonesia, and even less so
cultural people-to-people programs. The US relationship with Indonesia
remained primarily focused on security exigencies and military aid through the
early 1990’s.

“A Day That Will Live in Infamy”
The events on September 11, 2001, represented a major shock to US
policymakers, who were forced to quickly reorder their strategic and national
security priorities. Many Muslims in Indonesia were quick to distance themselves
from the attackers, quickly emphasizing their commitments to peace and expressing
their shock that Muslims could possibly commit such heinous acts.7 In what would
later become known as President Bush’s National Security Strategy, President Bush
emphasized two key goals; regional stability and cooperation among democratic
countries around the world.8 With a new imperative to reach out to other
democracies, especially those with Muslim majorities, President Bush committed to
increased military cooperation between the US and Indonesia. In the name of
fighting terrorism after the 2002 Bali bombing (by the al-Qaeda linked Indonesian
terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah,) the US ratcheted up its support for the
Indonesian military in the form of a $23 million aid package. In the 5 years after

7

Jane Song, Personal Interview, April 16 2014.
George W Bush, "National Security Strategy of the United States," news release,
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9/11, US aid to Indonesia in dollar terms (primarily focused on security and
economic development) increased by more than 50%.9

The Obama Years
After Obama’s election in 2008, Indonesians celebrated with impromptu
street parties, joyous that the American president would have experience with
Indonesia, having gone to school in Jakarta. President Obama took advantage of his
grassroots popularity by lining up a visit to Indonesia in 2010, during which he
declared his love for bakso and sate ayam.10 While this statement of cultural affinity
was sufficient in the minds of the average Indonesian to fulfill President Obama’s
commitment of goodwill towards Indonesia, Obama also sought to institutionalize
the relationship through the promotion of a new comprehensive partnership.
Announcing that pressing economic interests had prompted Presidents Obama and
SBY to re-examine the US-Indonesian bilateral relationship, the presidents revealed
a three-prong strategy to strengthen the relationship. Focusing on security,
economics and trade, and socio-cultural issues, the Comprehensive Partnership of
2010 was a major turning point that symbolized the Obama administration’s
commitment to emphasizing economic and cultural matters as important areas of
interest.11 12 The first prong, security, reified US commitments to defense

9

Diane Mauzy and Brian L. Job, "Us Policy in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey 47, no. 4
(2007).
10

Audrey Mint, Personal Interview, April 24 2014.
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US Department of State Office of the Spokesperson, "United States Indonesia
Comprehensive Partnership," news release, July 24, 2011.
11

cooperation and military-to-military linkages and cooperation, especially on
counter-terrorism initiatives. The second prong focused on increased economic
integration, aiming to increase two-way trade and investment, while also
encouraging Indonesian participation in multilateral economic initiatives like the
World Trade Organization and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The third
prong focused on educational, socio-cultural and scientific ends, aiming to
incentivize student exchanges, joint research and diversity awareness programs.
As a result of the Comprehensive Partnership, security cooperation
continued to flourish, as the US continued to supply weapons and training to the
Indonesian military. However, economic investment grew anemically, with new US
investment only totaling 5% of new investment in Indonesia in 2011.13 At recent
presentations in Washington DC, the top diplomats from Indonesia and the United
States agreed that while security cooperation between the US and Indonesia
remains strong, American-led economic and cultural programs are largely failing to
take root in Indonesia.14 In a new proposal endorsed by both of the Indonesian and
US ambassadors, the ambassadors recommend reinvigorating the third prong of the
comprehensive partnership (cultural) in order to jumpstart the second (trade and
investment). Leading a modest campaign to increase student exchanges, educational
grants, people-to-people programs and the Peace Corps presence in Indonesia,

12

Barack H. Obama, "Remarks at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta,"(2010).
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Murray Hiebert, "Comprehensive Partnership Nudges Us-Indonesia Relations to
New Levels of Cooperation," Center for Strategic and International Studies (2012).
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Scot Marciel, "Us-Indonesia Partnership for 2020,"(Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 2013).
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diplomats are crafting a strategy to more durably link Indonesia and the United
States closer together. The existing diplomatic consensus means that emphasis will
likely be placed on educational person-to-person programs aimed at generating
goodwill towards the United States.

Conclusion
The United States bilateral relationship with Indonesia has gone through a
process of growth and development. Beginning as an instrumental relationship in
which US aid to Indonesia aimed to curb the spread of communism, the two
countries became increasingly connected through military linkages. After the Cold
War, the United States occasionally exerted its influence to promote liberal values
and human rights, but the relationship remained focused on security concerns.
However, the Obama administration has at least nominally committed to
broadening the relationship and emphasizing economic and cultural programs, not
just security linkages. The future of the US-Indonesia relationship will likely see
increased emphasis on socio-cultural programs aimed at generating goodwill
towards the United States, due to a consensus of top policymakers. Section two of
this essay will focus on areas of contention that may influence the implementation
of these programs.
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Section Two: Roadblocks to Strengthening the Bilateral
Relationship
Section two will focus on the sources of friction between the United States
and Indonesian cultures as they relate to foreign policy. First I will examine
inconsistencies in knowledge about American lifestyles and values, and how they
might influence Indonesian perceptions about the United States. These knowledge
gaps make it difficult for US programs to generate general goodwill within
Indonesia. Then, I will discuss the US-Indonesia relationship from a policy
perspective, especially locating my analysis on Indonesian attitudes on American
hypocrisy and double standards in US foreign policy.

“Saya Suka Nasi Goreng” and “The Cool Factor”
According to American English teacher and PhD analytic writing tutor Matt
Liberace, the first question on every Indonesian person’s mind is about president
Obama.15 Owing to Obama’s affinity and educational history in Indonesia,
Indonesians in general love brining up his preferences for nasi goreng and bakso.
While this is certainly a superficial statement about the nature of the strength of USIndonesian relations, it serves as a vital jumping-off point of analysis for a
discussion of Indonesian cultural affinity towards the US. While there is not much
political depth to the average Indonesian person’s enthusiasm about Obama’s diet,
that same enthusiasm represents the power of the food, culture and lived
experience to create real empathy and attraction. Although Obama isn’t the only US

15

Matt Liberace, Personal Interview, April 24 2014.
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issue on Indonesian’s mind, the fact that he comes into conversations first and
foremost speaks volumes to the power of shared culture.
While Indonesian comments about Obama may be superficial, according to
Liberace, shifting cultural trends have minimized the American cultural role in
Indonesian everyday life. Today, young people in Indonesia are more likely to think
of the UK, Korea and France as “hip,” as other countries around the world develop
their own cultural exports.16 For example, the meteoric rise in popularity of Korean
boy-bands and “K-pop” indicate that while Hollywood is still relevant, the US is
facing peer competitors who increasingly have more cultural purchasing power. The
rise of Asian and European cultural products has taken the spotlight off of American
culture. This shift in what is “cool” has also been coupled with an increasing affinity
with other Muslim countries. Since Muslim Indonesians in general have felt
assaulted by Western culture, many see increased solidarity and closeness with
other Muslim cultures as a solution.17

The Knowledge Gap
Indonesians, often basing their assessments of American culture on reality
television shows on MTV or the indulgent lifestyles of Hollywood movie stars, may
come away with a warped perception of American values. The American cultural
hegemon, Hollywood, entertains not only Americans but also watchers from around
the world, including Indonesians. As a result, Indonesian knowledge about American
16

Ibid.

17

Song.

15

lifestyles is often inaccurate. Indonesians are often unaware of American social ills
like homelessness, believing instead that all Americans are wealthy.18 Since the
majority of Hollywood actors are homogenous, white, rich Americans, Indonesians
understandably create stereotypes about what the average American lifestyle must
be like.19 While most Americans watching “Jersey Shore” understand that the show
is contextualized by an entertainment media that fetishizes the extreme, and are
amused by the freak-show aspect of extreme behavior, Indonesians lack that
context, and may form generalizing assumptions about all Americans.
Religion in Indonesia, which plays a massive role in both everyday life and
national identity, is sometimes also a nexus point for misunderstandings. According
to Jane Song, an American masters degree candidate in Interfaith Relations, many
Muslims in Indonesia feel skeptical about US attitudes towards Islam:
“There are events of Islamophobia that have reached the news here – they’re
confused as to why Americans feel this way about Muslims. For example –
the mosque at ground zero, which was not a mosque and was not at ground
zero, the rhetoric surrounding that fiasco reached here. They’re also curious
about the treatment of Muslims after 9/11. They see the anti-sharia
legislation that’s in 20 states right now. If all you hear is rhetoric that is
hostile to Muslims, of course that has an impact.” 20
Additionally, differences in religious values create skepticism about American
morals and standards. Indonesians are often only exposed to Americans wearing
revealing clothing, in different styles than are culturally appropriate in Indonesia21.

18

Ibid.
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20

Song.

21

Liberace.
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This trend, along with Hollywood dramatizations of Americans’ sex lives, has led
many Indonesians to think that America is a “loose” country where people freely
have sex without concern for religious values or standards of decency.22 While this
attitude is not entirely accurate, it is understandable how Indonesians with limited
exposure to US lifestyles may come to these conclusions, based on the limited
evidence available to them.

Hypocrisy and Double Standards
While cultural differences between Indonesia and the United States come as
the result of incomplete knowledge or different values, there are also important
points of contention that deal with official US foreign policy. As outlined in the first
chapter, the US-Indonesia relationship has often been security-centric, which has
led many Indonesians to believe that it is transactional. This is bolstered by the fact
that US foreign policy is often hypocritical to its stated values, in short, failing to
“walk the walk” on liberal democracy.23 While paying lip service to the value of
democracy, the United States has installed dictatorial regimes in places like Egypt,
Iran, Guatemala and Haiti. According to Song, “[Indonesians] are aware of hypocrisy
between what the US says and what it does with regards to the rest of the world.
The US doesn’t like democracy when it doesn’t work well for us economically.”24
What’s more, the US domestic political issues are often held under the global

22

Song.

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.
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media’s magnifying glass, making it difficult to idealize the US as a model democratic
state. The United States is still figuring out democracy at home. The rest of the world
sees US elected officials publically speak and act with such vitriol (in highlypublicized events like autumn fall government shutdown) that Indonesians become
skeptical about the validity of American political prescriptions.
In discussing the US-Indonesia relationship, it is also crucial to note the
underlying unequal power dynamic between the two states. The United States, as
the country with the superior military capability, larger economy and burlier
diplomatic might, is able to exert much more influence over Indonesia than
Indonesia can over the United States. This dynamic makes it possible for the United
States to pursue its own interests with minimal regard to the effects on Indonesian
public opinion. As a highly-visible example, the US company Freeport McMoran, a
natural resource extrusion company based out of Louisiana, has come under fire for
its practices in Papua. Many Indonesians are frustrated that Freeport’s gold mine,
the largest in the world, is extracting gold in a way that minimally involves local
Indonesians. Additionally, the profits are effectively split by the United States,
whose GDP is bolstered by Freeport’s mining activity, and Jakarta, which benefits
from Freeport’s paid taxes. The federal government in Jakarta is able to reap
financial benefit from Freeport’s mining operation without ever facing the direct
environmental and human cost of such an operation. Freeport, the largest taxpayer
in Indonesia, has been criticized for lax regulation and a disregard for best practice
compliance in gold mining.25 American companies like Freeport have been

25

Liberace.
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operating in Indonesia since the Suharto era, when Indonesia embraced USchampioned economic liberalization policies in an attempt to grow its anemic
economy. This allowed international corporations access to Indonesian resources,
capital and labor, and also the freedom to operate autonomously provided they
continued paying federal taxes.26 Companies like Freeport are supported by the US
Chamber of Commerce, which helps American companies compete abroad through
diplomatic and trade channels. Since American companies have access to a much
more established support network, it is easier for them to compete abroad,
sometimes to the detriment of the local populations, as in the case of Freeport. As a
result, many Indonesians are skeptical of benevolent US involvement in Indonesia,
since some of the most visible US corporations are doing the most damage to
Indonesia’s natural resources and human capital.

Conclusion
The United States faces many roadblocks in generating pro-US sentiments in
Indonesia. Gaps in knowledge, differing values, and exploitative US policies make it
difficult for the United States to reach Indonesians and generate cultural affinity for
the US. The next and final section will examine public opinion polling data to
determine what Indonesians consider important in formulating their opinions about
the United States, and will conclude with a discussion of how an ideal cultural
program might generate cultural affinity towards the United States.

26
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Section Three: Public Opinion and Recommendations for Designing
Future Programs
Indonesian Opinions of the United States
The final section of this paper will focus on quantitative measures of
Indonesian perceptions of the United States, and will recommend programmatic
elements to maximize the success of future cultural programs. According to a
personal communication from the Public Affairs Officer of the US Consulate General
in Surabaya, the US has primarily “emphasized the promotion of study in the United
States, English language acquisition, and various types of cultural programs that
lead to people-to-people exchanges.27”

Chart 1 – General Opinion of the US

In general, public opinion
of the United States in Indonesia
has been influenced by two
factors – the American president
and the bellicosity of American
foreign policy, particularly
towards the Muslim world and
the Middle East. As
demonstrated in Chart 1, Indonesian’s opinion of America vastly improved following
the election of President Obama in 2008.28 While the Bush years saw consistently

27Andrew

Veveiros, Personal Interview, 2014.
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Thomas Pepinsky, "Politics, Public Opinion and the Us-Indonesian
Comprehensive Partnership," The National Bureau of Asian Research NBR Special
Report(2010).
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negative attitudes (over 50% answering that they had “unfavorable” opinions about
the United States), Obama’s personal connection to Indonesia as well as his decision
to visit Jakarta provided a marked bump in public opinion. Perceptions of America
during the Bush years were also influenced by American foreign policy abroad,
which included an emphasis on combatting terrorism abroad and the invasion of
Iraq in 2003. Indonesian
discontent with the US-led
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
demonstrates that the average
Indonesian voter is in tune
with, at least generally, the
broad strokes of US foreign
policy, and feels concerned
about US interventions, perhaps specifically owing to a feeling of religious solidarity
(Chart 2).29 These trends are particularly illuminating when considering how public
opinion may limit the US’s ability to generate bilateral cultural affinity. As Obama
has a unique connection with Indonesia that is unlikely to be replicated by any
future president, it is foolish to suggest the US-Indonesia relationship be predicated
off the personality of the commander-in-chief. Additionally, as long as the American
president is perceived to be anti-Islam or particularly prone to intervention in the
Muslim world (like President Bush,) Indonesian are less likely to perceive the US
favorably, regardless of the status of cultural programs. While future programs may

29
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reach key student demographics, they are unlikely to reach all Indonesians, who
may inevitably base their conceptions of the United States on either the attitude of
the president or the perceived malevolence of US interventions abroad. This trend
supports increased programmatic focus on religion and interfaith dialogue in order
to address Indonesian concerns about anti-Islam sentiment and rhetoric coming
from the United States.

Current Cultural Programs
The United States and Indonesia, respectively the second and third largest
democracies in the world, are continuing to develop their economies and deepen
their bilateral relationship. Within this context, it is vital to examine the cultural
programs currently in place between the two countries in order to evaluate their
effectiveness and make recommendations for the implementation of future
programs.
Cultural programs between the United States and Indonesia are dominated
by educational exchanges. However, in the realm of higher education study abroad,
many Indonesians view the United States as an unattractive destination.
Increasingly choosing to study in Singapore, Canada or the United Kingdom, many
Indonesians are looking for countries they perceive to be friendlier to Islam.30
However, under the leadership of Presidents Obama and SBY, the US-Indonesia
Comprehensive Partnership provides over $160 million to fund higher-education
exchanges, which include Fulbright programs, STEM research transfers, and USAID

30
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scholarships.31 The Fulbright English language instruction program, the largest in
the world, has educated nearly 100,000 Indonesian students over the past decade.32
Nearly one hundred Americans are working in Indonesia through the Peace Corps,
newly renewed after participants were expelled in 1965 (after being accused by
Indonesia of spying). Through English language instruction and cross-cultural
dialogue between American and Indonesian students, governmental and NGO
programs are effective in creating people-to-people contact and engaging students
culturally. Since 2010, the amount of visas issued to Indonesian students has also
risen by over 25%, aided by a consular program called @america which helps
Indonesian students through the confusing visa application process.33
US-led cultural programs are making a modest impact on cultural affinity
between the United States and Indonesia. According to the Consulate General, “to
determine whether these programs are successful requires assessing the initiatives
over time, and quite possibly it is too early to reach any conclusions.”34 Additionally,
according to ex-Indonesian ambassador Dino Djalal, the anemic economic
integration of the two economies is largely due to insufficient cultural exchange
programs, and the fact that Indonesians and Americans are largely unaware of and
uninterested in the other country’s culture.35 The following sub-section will use
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lessons learned from these programs in order to recommend attributes for future
programs, in order to strengthen the US-Indonesian relationship to the benefit of
both countries.

Attributes of an Ideal Cultural Exchange Program
First, an ideal cultural program would focus on areas of demonstrated need
in Indonesia. One such area is education, in which Indonesia might seriously benefit
from a slew of native English speakers who could help students with language
instruction. As the Indonesian educational system is regarded as one of the worst in
the world, educational programs would both fill a need for language instructors, and
strengthen the bilateral relationship by providing vital person-to-person contact.36
Educational programs should also be implemented in order to increase best practice
sharing, technology and curriculum transfers, and capacity building in Indonesian
schools, along with the goal of generating cultural affinity. Another such area of
demonstrated need is sustainability and natural resource use. As focus on
sustainability in Indonesia is inappropriately low, recycling and other sustainability
programs are failing due to a lack of attention and knowledge.37 Indonesia is the
fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and US-Indonesian cultural
programs might serve an additional purpose of helping to reduce both countries’
emissions and pollution. Effective cultural programs will show genuine American
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interest in Indonesian culture while reinforcing American commitments to actually
address areas of Indonesian need.
Next, an ideal cross-cultural program should also include religious training
and cross-cultural experiential learning. In addition to the previously explored
misunderstandings about American lifestyles and values, Indonesians often
misunderstand concepts of secularity, thinking it is an exclusively anti-religious
sentiment.38 Islam and America’s Judeo-Christian culture share an Abrahamic
background, a strong tradition of orthodoxy (as opposed to orthopraxy) and shared
prophets, which could provide students common ground upon which to base a
conversation.39 Additionally, the prominence of Muslim mass organizations,
including Muhammadiyah and NU (which include a combined 80 million members)
makes them an ideal staging ground to reach huge Indonesian audiences.40
Muhammadiyah has already seen success in briefing Peace Corps volunteers before
their service trips, and helping to implement with USAID public health programs.41
Finally, future cultural programs should follow an innovative, technology
driven approach like that of @america. In the current consular program, young
Indonesians have access to a high-tech interactive display kiosk at a mall in Jakarta,
which provides information about topics relating to America. The kiosk also
dispenses personalized advice, especially to Indonesians who want to study abroad
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in the United States.42 As Indonesia is the country with the third highest number of
Facebook subscribers and the highest number of twitter users, social media has
proven a critical tool in reaching Indonesians, specifically young people. In the case
of @america, nearly 60,000 curious Indonesians are receiving information about
America on their twitter feeds, removing even the need to physically come to the
mall kiosk. Any program aimed at generating goodwill among large groups of
Indonesia would wisely consider technology as an important tool with the capability
to multiply program effectiveness.
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Conclusion
While the US-Indonesia bilateral relationship has historically
underemphasized cultural exchange at the expense of security and military focused
programs, the two governments are increasingly focusing on culture as a vital
bridge. Programs aimed at generating cultural affinity should emphasize person-toperson contact in order to break down the knowledge gaps that paralyze cultural
dialogue. I recommend that American programs focus on areas of Indonesian need,
include religious components while involving religious mass organizations, and use
technology and social media to reach a wide audience of Indonesians. Although the
deepening of the US-Indonesia relationship faces many challenges, there is certainly
cause for optimism. Each program aimed at strengthening the bilateral strategic
relationship also contains its own reward: warm and enduring personal friendships
between Indonesians and Americans.
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Organization

Position

Location

Date

Jane Song

UGM

Masters candidate –
Interfaith relations

UGM

4/16/14

Andrew
Veveiros

Surabaya Consulate
General

Public Affairs Officer

E-mail
Correspondence

4/20/14

Audrey Mint

Vassar College

Academic Focus

Jogjakarta

4/24/14

Matt
Liberace

UNY

English Teacher / PhD
writing tutor

Jogjakarta

4/24/14

Note: Pseudonyms were used at the request of interview subjects to protect anonymity
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